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SAFETY IMPACTS OF 
IN - CAR NAVIGATION SYSTEMS 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
In-car navigation systems constitute one of the most prominent groups of road traffic informatics 
developments, some systems are already on the market. To evaluate the safety related influences of 
these systems on driver behaviour empirical research is needed. In a study funded by BMW and 
DRIVE the authors were to answer the question which kind of test route would be appropriate for such 
research work. Here, some of the more principal Lines of reasoning Leading to the proposal of test 
route characteristics are presented. 
 
At first, we List the possible effects, that navigation systems can have on driver behaviour and try to 
explain these effects within some theoretical framework. 
 
problems of mental Load, visual distraction, over-reliance, deskilling, interactions with unprotected 
road-users and system misuse are discussed. 
 
The next paragraph discusses various parameters of drivers and the road environment that possibly 
moderate the outcome of a study for each of the effects Listed above. The most important variables 
are the degree of driving experience, the driver’s special abilities and their amount of local knowledge 
about the road network. 
 
Some general conclusions from the discussion for test route selection are summarised. 
 
 
1. SAFETY RELATED CHANGES IN DRIVER BEHAVIOUR DUE TO NAVIGATION 
SYSTEMS 
 
The development of NS has been motivated by a lot of possible 
positive effects concerning economical, ecological and safety 
aspects. We shall focus our attention in the following 
analysis on those effects of NS that are directly safety 
related. Of course, there are also indirect effects on 
safety, e.g. if the NS shortens the routes in time or space 
and thus changes the driving exposition. 
 
This chapter tries to give a short description of possible 
effects of NS on driver behaviour at various levels of the 
driving task. 
 
Two classes of models with different backgrounds and purposes 
have become useful —and therefore common— in distinguishing 
between different driving tasks and respective driver 
information processing activities. One class is in the 
tradition of the attempt to model driver behaviour as a 
hierarchical task (JOHANNSEN 1976, JANSSEN 1979), the other 
has been developed by RASMUSSEN (1983) in the context of 
supervisory control tasks. Recently, several authors have 
attempted to combine these models (e.g. PARKES 1989, RUMAR 
1990, HALE et al 1990). 
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We shall use some of the concepts of these frameworks in the next 
chapters to describe the safety related aspects of driver 
behaviour which are likely to occur in the context of NS. We 
therefore give a brief description of the model. 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical structure of the road user task (after 
JANSSEN 1979) 
  
 
The driving process is modelled as a hierarchical task structure. 
Performance is differentiated at three levels. On the strategic 
level the driver makes trip—specific decisions. He sets goals 
like definition of trip destination, sub-goals about what routes 
to take etc, i.e. he is planning his trip. Performance at this 
level is therefore directly related to the navigation task. If 
the navigation task is not automatised (like on daily used roads 
for the same purpose), it affords conscious processing at a 
knowledge-based leve 1. 
 
The general plans from the strategic level have to be transformed 
into controlled patterns of action. Behaviour at this manoeuvring 
level is mainly rule—based, i.e. it follows learned “if—then” 
rules. The driver e.g. decides to overtake and retrieves the 
necessary information about the actions for that manoeuvre from 
long—term memory. Finally, on the control level of driving, 
strongly automatised action patterns dominate behaviour. Actions 
on that level are quick, efficient and can be taken without great 
subjective effort. They are called skills and they don’t afford 
conscious attentional control by the driver. For an experienced 
driver, examples of skills are using the steering wheel, clutch, 
brake etc. 
 
1.1 Mental bad 
 
Mental bad has become a key concept in psychology and human 
factors research in the last decades. GSTALTER & FASTENMEIER 
(1987) have summarised the main theoretical assumptions and 
implications of the construct recently in an attempt to evaluate 
different stress-measurement techniques in the PROMETHEUS 
context. We therefore restrict our presentation here to aspects 
of mental bad that are of key importance for the construction and 
evaluation of NS. 
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The notion of mental bad in connection with NS is twofold: Some 
authors predict a decrease in the drivers mental bad, because 
less attention on the driver’s side would be needed for 
navigation purposes, others f ear an overload induced by the 
presentation of navigation information in highly demanding 
traffic situations. 
 
How can a navigation system reduce mental workload? 
 
Navigation, mainly consisting of route planning and route 
following is a knowledge-based activity located at the strategic 
level of the model in Figure 1. This kind of information 
processing is serial, slow and error—prone. Everything processed 
in this mode has to pass the bottleneck of conscious awareness. 
This kind of information processing is therefore extremely time— 
and resource—consuming. If a NS can substitute elements on the 
strategic level it has the potential to reduce the driver’s 
mental bad. This is, e.g., the case, if drivers don’t have to 
activate their knowledge about the road network (their “cognitive 
maps”) to decide between possible alternative ways during the 
trip. 
 
Another way to decrease mental bad can be achieved by a shift 
from knowledge-based to rule-based behaviour, i.e. from the 
strategic to the manoeuvring bevel. If a NS tells or shows the 
driver to turn left at the next junction, the decision is taken 
over by the system and the task left over to the driver —prepare 
for the manoeuvres for the turning off— is a rule—based (or 
partly even sensorimotor) activity. 
 
Still another possibility of reducing mental bad by the system 
can result from an easier perception and/or interpretation of 
useful navigation information via the NS compared to driving 
without the system (e.g. seeking and reading sign boards, street 
names etc versus having this information on the in—car display). 
 
As the model of the driving task in figure 1 is a hierarchical 
one, you could suppose spare mental capacity on a higher level to 
be of use in terms of more attentional resources on the bower 
levels. 
 
It is important to note that all potential benefits described 
above only apply to cases, where the driver really has to manage 
a knowledge—based navigation task. No effect on the driver’s 
mental bad can be expected on well—known routes between sources 
and destinations like workplace and home. Here the navigation 
task is automatised and subconsciously controlled. 
 
But intelligent systems (e.g. LISB), which can supply the driver 
with recommendations based on real—time information about 
disturbances in traffic flow like jams or accidents can of course 
indirectly bower the driver’s mental bad by guiding him/her on 
routes with an easier driving task to perform. 
 
Of course, all advantages listed above are only advantages in the 
sense that they can be achieved by an optimal design of the NS. 
PARKES (1989) and ZIMMER (1990) give detailed information about 
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the requirements connected with the planning and construction of 
RTI systems. If the design of the system or the system-interface 
is bad, the system can become counterproductive. It can disturb 
and distract the driver, it can give the wrong kind of 
information and/or at a wrong point in time, or it can display 
information that is hard to understand etc. In total, badly 
designed systems can produce an increase in mental bad. 
 
It follows that NS should be carefully designed and in any case 
their effects should be empirically tested, nevertheless. 
 
What is the relationship between mental bad and safety? 
 
It is often (more or less implicitly) assumed that an increase in 
strain or mental workload automatically impairs human 
performance. This is obviously wrong as long as the driver can 
cope with the situation by using greater mental effort. VERWEY & 
JANSSEN (1988) mention this point and refer to the distinction 
between “data—limited” and “resource—limited” conditions (NORMAN 
& BOBROW 1975): “In resource-limited conditions (i.e. in task 
conditions where the operator has no spare capacity), human 
performance is fully determined by the demands of the task and 
mental bad decrement will immediately result in performance 
increment. In data—limited conditions, however, (i.e. if spare 
capacity is available) performance corresponds less to mental 
bad, because humans can use spare capacity to compensate for 
extra task demands.” 
 
Another argument against a simple relationship between traffic 
safety and driver’s mental bad is the fact that traffic 
participation is -at beast in many situations- a self-paced task. 
Drivers therefore have coping strategies (like reducing speed) to 
compensate for higher levels of mental bad. That drivers really 
behave in a way to hold task demands on a constant level (“strain 
homeostasis”) has been shown in a number of investigations 
(GSTALTER 1985, HOYOS & KASTNER 1986, VAN WINSUM 1987). 
 
For the topic under discussion here it follows that safetyrelated 
changes in mental bad due to NS should be studied under 
conditions near the resource limits. 
 
1.2. Multiple resources 
 
In the discussion above we have treated “resources” as a single, 
homogenous source of attentional capacity. This concept of 
attention as a flexible, time-sharing processing resource of 
limited capacity has been introduced by KAHNEMANN (1973). This 
has been shown to be too simple to explain certain phenomena of 
time-sharing performance (WICKENS 1984, 1987, FARBER 1987). Not 
only the level of task demand, but task structure became the 
object of research. A multiple—resource model was developed by 
WICKENS (1987) that conceived of resources as separate energy 
supply systems to different information processing structures. 
WICKENS (1987) modelled the human resource structure in a three—
dimensional space. 
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Figure 2: A model of the multiple resources within the human 
 processing system (after WICKENS 1987)           . 
 
  
Obviously, this notion has important consequences for the design 
of information systems, if their interaction with drivers should 
result in data-limited structures. VERWEY & JANSSEN (1988, p.16) 
draw detailed inferences from the multiple—resource model for 
navigation system design, especially with regard to the question 
of when auditory or visual information presentation should be 
preferred. They conclude: 
 
“... it can be expected that the presentation of simple visual 
navigation information is less intrusive than auditory 
information, but at the same time more interfering with visual 
demands of the driving tasks. Predictions concerning the 
optimal presentation modality are therefore hard to make. 
Self—paced information, however, may induce integration of 
information intake with other driving tasks. Because the 
visual modality is better suited for self-paced information, 
visual route guidance information presentation may show more 
practice effects than auditory and, eventually, this may lead 
to an advantage for visual information.” 
 
How can overload influence safety? 
 
According to RUNAR (1986) under normal driving conditions (data-
limited case) the order of importance of information is the 
following: Highest priority for information about the road 
(control level), medium priority for information about the 
interaction with other vehicles (manoeuvring level) and lowest 
priority for navigation information (strategic level). But what 
happens if a driver cannot avoid a state of mental overload? 
VERWEY & JANSSEN assume that drivers are capable of ignoring less 
critical driving tasks (in terms of safety) to cope with overload 
conditions: 
 
..... differences in mental bad as a result of navigation are 
expected to’ exhibit themselves in tasks like driving speed, 
stopping time, navigational errors and mirror usage. No 
effects are expected on the occurrence of critical incidents.” 
(VERWEY & JANSSEN 1988, p. 17) 
 
This is an optimistic point of view. It could also be argued (as 
has been done e.g. by PARKES 1989), that drivers under overload 
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conditions are liable to changes in the normal prioritisation of 
information. If navigational information is given priority over 
important aspects of the roadway ahead, critical situations will 
occur. This kind of prioritisation of the navigation task can be 
strengthened by so—called “command—effects” induced by a 
navigation system. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The current theoretical state of the art is insufficient. At the 
moment, NS can only be evaluated empirically. Investigations 
should be carried out under resource—limited conditions. 
 
1.3. Visual distraction 
 
The driving task puts a heavy bad on the visual channel; most of 
the information intake and feedback is visually controlled. Each 
distraction of the driver’s view therefore is a potential danger 
because relevant visual information from the roadway can get lost 
during the scanning of an in-car display. This obvious f act has 
been recognised early and led to research about the amount of 
distraction induced by visual displays. Various techniques have 
been developed to measure and quantify visual distraction. 
ROCKWELL (1988) has introduced the notion of “visual cost”. The 
most important parameter is the time, the driver is diverted from 
the front view. It can be split into glance frequency and glance 
duration. A high glance frequency can be a hint for bad 
memorability of the information presented at in-car displays, 
glance duration can be used to evaluate the ease of information 
extraction from the display. For more details on how to quantify 
“visual cost” using “visual matrices” see ROCKWELL (1988) and 
FAIRCLOUGH & PARKES (1990). 
 
WIERWILLE et al (1988) and WIERWILLE et al (1989) could not find 
evidence for the intrusion of displays as navigation aids. They 
concluded that drivers are able to adapt their visual scan 
patterns appropriately. Although in the WIERWILLE et al (1989) 
study the level of visual demand imposed by the driving task was 
varied as well as the amount of traffic volume, we conclude that 
his subjects still drove in a state of “data—limited” processing 
(compare the discussion in the previous chapter). 
 
PARKES (1989) and especially FAIRCLOUGH & PARKES (1990) have 
compared the distribution of visual attention in a field study. 
An in—car navigation device was tested against a map condition 
and compared to a control condition (no navigation component). 
 
The following table summarises the results. 
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Table 1: Distribution of visual attention over the forward view 
for both conditions (n=10) compared to a control (n=24) 
. Control Map Computer 
 
Rear view mirror 2.3 1.7 2.3 
Roadway 92 67.2 76.1 
Navigation device --- 22.1 12.1 
Dashboard 1.5 0.2 0.3 
TOTAL 95.8% 91.2% 90.8% 
 
In the control condition, 92 % of the driver’s visual attention 
was allocated to the roadway ahead. This number decreased 
considerably for the drivers with the navigation aid 
(“computer”), but even more in the map group (76% and 67%, 
respectively). For a detailed analysis see FAIRCLOUGH & PARKES 
(1990). 
 
Sometimes it is argued that “auditory costs” should be considered 
in an analogous way by systems that make use of acoustic 
information presentation. These systems could disturb or even 
startle the driver by giving sudden unexpected messages. 
Moreover, noise from the traffic environment can be masked and 
the perception of the motor noise of the own vehicle distorted. 
Although these effects may occur, we don’t treat “auditory costs” 
here as a special chapter or effect, because we don’t see a 
direct relationship between the occurrence of these effects and 
specific traffic situations. If a system gives acoustic messages 
to the driver, the driver’s reaction to the message should be 
observed; but the inclusion of specific traffic situations to 
test for these effects seems unnecessary to us. 
 
It is important to note that the difference between driving in a 
well—known area (i.e. driving without a real navigation task 
involved) is very much easier than driving in strange 
environments. The difference in the visual distribution cited 
above therefore cannot be interpreted in the sense that the 
navigation device impairs traffic safety compared to “normal” 
conditions in strange environments (which are better approximated 
by the map condition). The amount of increased task complexity 
and thus reduced traffic safety induced by the search task has 
been demonstrated lately by ENGELS & DELLEN (1989) in a study 
comparing the accident risk of native and foreign drivers. 
Foreign drivers were significantly over-represented in the 
causation of those accidents which happened in a traffic 
situation involving an orientation component (e.g. in junctions, 
approaches to junctions, lane—changing), whereas other accident 
causes (e.g. speeds too high, headways too short ) showed an 
equal distribution of accident causation proportion of foreigners 
and native drivers. 
 
GALSTERER & GSTALTER (1990) could also show on the basis of 
error—data that a related sample of drivers had more safety— 
related problems in unknown parts of Berlin compared to their 
trips in well known parts of the road network. 
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In another study GALSTERER et al (1990) observed a significant 
increase in lane—exceedences by drivers with the LISB— navigation 
system compared to trips without an electronic device. They 
attributed the effect at least in part to visual distraction 
factors. 
 
In total, a glimpse on the literature about the safety-related 
consequences of visual distraction by the use of navigation 
displays seems to sample confusing or even contradictory pieces 
of evidence. But reasoning about why and how visual distraction 
can influence safety leads back to the notion of mental workload 
discussed in some detail in the previous chapter. If we perceive 
the requirement of scanning a display as a classical dual task, 
adding mental workload to the primary task of driving, we would 
arrive at the same inference like that in Chapter 1.1: If the 
joint mental bad of primary and secondary task (both competing 
for the same kind of attentional resources!) reaches the bevel of 
resource—limited processing, driver performance is likely to 
deteriorate, possibly explainable in terms of a shift in RUMAR’s 
prioritisation of information from different relevant sources. 
 
In other words, in its consequences we might view hazards through 
visual distraction as a special case of the general mental bad 
topic or as a cause of reaching an overload level of information 
processing. Thus, if we take into consideration all other 
variables influencing drivers mental bad, we come to more 
conclusive results about the hazards induced by visual 
distraction through NS. In this context the varying results of 
experimental studies on the topic become more comprehensible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Visual distraction through the use of in—car navigation systems 
can be potentially dangerous. If, therefore, a given NS is 
suspected to divert the driver’s view too often or for a too long 
time span from the roadway ahead, this assumption has to be 
tested empirically. 
 
1.4. Over-reliance 
 
Over-reliance on technical systems, sometimes referred to as 
“overconfidence” means too much trust into the system. A typical 
case might be as follows. The driver has made a destination input 
into the navigation system in an unknown traffic environment. 
When he books at the display later on, he sees that his 
destination is at a right angle to the left of his car’s position 
and he approaches a junction. That arrangement may influence him 
to try to turn left at the intersection. If his reliance on the 
system is very strong he may attempt to turn bet, even if it is 
prohibited at that junction. This effect is sometimes referred to 
as a “command—effect”. The tendency to “obey” the system’s 
message will be strengthened by the “confirming bias” people 
have: we always try to obtain information which justifies our 
actions and tend to ignore contradictory evidence (see e.g. 
MICHON et al 1990, REASON 1990). 
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Over-reliance will probably vary with the experience a driver has 
in using the system and with the driver’s knowledge about the 
system’s performance and failures. Probably, system 
“intelligence” will also influence the liability of the driver to 
command—effects. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the present discussion it is important to note that in a 
study of a NS the routes chosen should include features, where 
over-reliance—effects can show up. 
 
1.5 Deterioration of skills 
 
Deskilling is often mentioned as a peril of automation. It means 
that a human operator, whose task (or parts of it) have been 
taken over by machines looses his/her skill because of back of 
practice. If — in an emergency situation— the operator has to go 
back to manual control, various factors work in favour of 
ineffective control. BAINBRIDGE (1983, p. 775): 
 
“... a formerly experienced operator who has been monitoring 
an automated process may now be an in experienced one. If he 
takes over, he may set the process into oscillation. He may 
have to wait for feedback, rather than controlling by open— 
bop, and it will be difficult for him to interpret whether the 
feedback shows that there is something wrong with the system 
or more simply that he has misjudged his control action. He 
will need to make actions to counteract his ineffective 
control, which will add to his workload.” 
 
 
Deterioration of skills has sometimes been found in pilots who 
had used auto-pilot-systems for longer time-periods (DREYFUS & 
DREYFUS 1986), as well as in the case of supervisory control 
tasks in power plants (SHARIT et al 1987, SHERIDAN 1987). 
 
In our opinion, no skills of the driver are substituted by 
current NS. But as RASMUSSEN (198 6, p.113) points out: 
 
“An important point is that it is not the behavioural patterns 
of the higher levels that are becoming automated skills. 
Automated time—space behavioural patterns are developing while 
they are controlled and supervised by the higher level 
activities, which will eventually deteriorate, and their basis 
as knowledge and rubes may deteriorate.” 
 
What kind of knowledge could deteriorate through long-term use of 
NS? To answer this question one needs to know how drivers 
navigate in unknown environments, i.e. what kinds of knowledge 
they acquire and use. There is a back of experimental studies in 
this respect. SCHRAAGEN (1989) has recently reviewed the concepts 
from cognitive science that could be fruitful for this topic. He 
proposes three types of spatial knowledge, organised 
hierarchically: landmark and sensorimotor knowledge, procedural 
or route knowledge and surveyk knowledge. In principle, features 
of all three types of knowledge could deteriorate through 
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long-term use of NS. Will map-reading ability decrease? Does 
 
NS-use diminish driver’s knowledge about traffic signs? 
 
These questions can only be answered by long—term studies. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although often mentioned in the context of in-car NS, it is not 
quite clear what skills can deteriorate on the driver’s side. 
Moreover, possible skill deterioration would probably take its 
time. Therefore, we don’t see a necessity of regarding deskilling 
as a permanent danger involved in the introduction of NS. 
 
1.6. Problems with pedestrians and cyclists 
 
This is no real aspect of its own: Paying less attention to 
unprotected road—users by drivers using NS is a function or 
consequence of more general aspects like “mental bad” or “visual 
distraction”. It is nevertheless treated in an extra paragraph 
here because of its great accident potential and expected 
accident severity. ZIMMER (1990) lists “perceiving of unprotected 
road—users” under the heading “possible negative effects of 
driving aids”, but he doesn’t comment on it. RISSER et ab (1982). 
and GALSTERER & GSTALTER (1990), and CHALOUPKA et al. (1991) 
could demonstrate less careful driving with respect to 
unprotected road—users and worse information acquisition by 
drivers that had orientation problems. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Because of the relationship between driver orientation and safety 
of pedestrians and cyclists, test routes should always contain 
areas with unprotected traffic participants, when a NS is under 
study. 
 
1.7. System misuse 
 
New systems can often be misused in the sense that it is fun to 
play with them, to explore their possibilities etc. This is of 
particular importance if a driver plays with a NS during driving. 
But we are not going to establish “system misuse” in our list of 
effects of NS on behaviour, because of two main reasons. At 
first, even if playing with the system can be observed in a study 
it can be assumed that this kind of behaviour will not last for 
long. Moreover, this kind of system misuse doesn’t seem to be 
site—specific, i.e. we wouldn’t expect it to show up at certain 
kinds of roads. 
 
Another kind of “misuse” is wrong interaction with the NS. This 
is an important aspect as well. Display and dialogue design 
should be carefully managed in the sense that errors in 
interaction with the NS are minimised. Proposals and requirements 
for good interface design can be taken from a large number of 
guidelines and design rubes or even standards. 
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2. RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF DRIVERS AND THE ROAD ENVIRONMENT 
 
In the following paragraphs, we shortly discuss critical 
variables of the driver, road environment and format of a 
display, which will considerably moderate the amount of strain 
induced by visual distraction. 
 
2.1. Driving experience and driving skill 
 
Like all skill acquisition processes, learning to drive a car to 
a considerable extent consists of substituting knowledge—based 
behaviour by rubes and rule—based behaviour shifts with growing 
experience to the bevel of automatic skill—based behaviour. 
Experienced drivers therefore have much more spare mental 
capacity that can be used to talk, listen to the radio, etc. 
compared to beginners. Different strategies of eye movements 
between beginners and experienced drivers have already been shown 
by MOURANT & ROCKWELL (1970). Experienced drivers combine various 
skills into more holistic strategies. This kind of skill 
integration favours experienced drivers in the task of including 
additional information requirements -like booking at a display-
over beginners. This fact is possibly limited to the case of 
self—paced information. 
 
It follows that a careful examination of the driver’s experience 
should take place in attempts to evaluate visual distraction by 
NS. 
 
2.2. Map reading ability 
 
The spatial ability of drivers varies to a large extent. People 
with bow spatial ability are going to have great problems reading 
a map but also problems of orientation with the “help” of 
displays using spatial representations of the road environment 
(like e.g. Travel-Pilot). This will certainly strongly effect the 
glance duration and thereby modify the extent to which visual 
distraction from the front view will be found in a study. 
 
Several investigations have shown that approximately 40 % of the 
adult population have considerable problems in map reading. 
Especially in the case of experimental studies with small numbers 
of subjects, map—reading ability has to be taken into account as 
an important moderator variable affecting the degree of visual 
distraction by NS. 
 
2.3. Complexity of the driving task 
 
Mental bad will easier reach resource-limits of the driver the 
more complex a driving task is. Complexity differs between static 
characteristics of the road environment (e.g. different types of 
roads and junctions), the manoeuvres required (e.g. turning off 
versus straight ahead) and the time—variable parameters (e.g. 
traffic flow). The more complex the primary task of driving, the 
less spare capacity will be left. Task demand for this reason has 
to be controlled in experiments assessing the safety impacts of 
NS. 
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2.4. Knowledge of the road network 
 
The same logic applies to the degree of knowledge a driver has 
about an environment. This can be confounded with the purpose of 
the trip (e.g. routes driven for professional reasons will tend 
to be better known than ravely used routes for recreational 
purposes). 
 
2.5. Modality and format of the display 
 
A number of studies has compared visual against auditory 
information given by NS. A detailed discussion of the advantages 
and drawbacks of both input modalities can be found in VERWEY & 
JANSSEN (1988). Some systems combine both input channels (e.g. 
LISB). The driver is alerted by an auditory signal when a message 
is displayed on the monitor. Oversimplified, auditory information 
seems to be better suited for drivers not used to electronic 
route guidance. With practice the visual modality may have 
advantages because it allows for better skill integration. 
 
Modality effects have to be separated from differences caused by 
stimulus properties of the display. The level of pacing, the 
coding of information, hardware characteristics and the overall 
design of the interface clearly have great influences on how much 
a NS can interfere with the visual attention required by the 
driving task. General statements of the principles that should 
guide the design of the interface can be found in ZIMMER (1990). 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There is a bot of possible effects that a navigation system can 
have on the safe conduct of a car. Even if a system is carefully 
designed according to the task at hand and to the design 
guidelines concerning the man—machine interface, this does not 
guarantee safety. New systems therefore always will have to be 
tested empirical by. 
 
For positive and negative effects of the system oppearing during 
test drives it is proposed to choose a combination of test route 
characteristics and subjects that achieve a performance near 
resource—limited conditions. Because some driver variables, 
mainly driving experience, spatial abilities and the degree of 
local knowledge about the test area influence mental bad of the 
driver heavily, for experienced drivers the complexity of the 
traffic sites should be very high, whereas for novices and 
elderly, foreigners or people with bow spatial abilities average 
driving conditions will suffice. 
 
Detailed instructions how to proceed in optimising the test route 
complexity for given samples of subjects are given in our 
research report (GSTALTER & FASTENMEIER 1991). 
 
Once the difficulty of the overall test route has been selected 
the researcher should refer to a list of special traffic 
situations that allow for a testing of visual distraction and 
over-reliance effects. 
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Because of the great vulnerability of pedestrians and cyclists a 
safety evaluation should also include areas with sufficient 
numbers of unprotected road users. 
 
All the necessary details for these subtasks can be found in 
GSTALTER & FASTENMEIER (1991). 
 
 
4. PUTTING THINGS TOGETHER: EFFECTS OF NAVIGATION SYSTEMS ON 
DIFFERENT GROUPS OF DRIVERS 
 
Chapter 1 has reviewed several possible influences NS can have on 
driver behaviour, Chapter 2 has argued that certain 
characteristics of drivers might moderate these effects. Chapters 
1 and 4 try to combine the information from both chapters. 
 
Chapter 5 finally will give detailed information on how a test 
route should be constructed to achieve high or medium complexity. 
 
Drivers handicapped by inexperience, bow spatial ability and each 
of prior knowledge about the road network they have to navigate 
through are going to reach resource—limited information 
processing structures quite early. We therefore propose test 
routes with normal complexity and average traffic flow. The 
greater the driving experience, the better the drivers spatial 
abilities and the better the local knowledge of the test area, 
the more spare mental capacity these kind of drivers’ will have. 
For effects of the NS on these drivers to emerge, the researcher 
should choose difficult traffic situations to allow for resource—
limited conditions. Besides this general choice rube for the 
route’s degree of complexity, special traffic sites or situations 
should be incorporated if “Visual cost”, “Over-reliance” or 
“Pedestrians and cyclists” as effects can be assumed to occur 
because of the characteristics of the system under study. The 
next chapter will discuss, what situations should be included for 
what effects. 
 
4.1.Mental load 
 
As stated above, medium route complexity should be chosen, if the 
test drivers are novice or elderly drivers, if they have little 
orientation abilities or if they do not know the test areas. The 
contrary applies for experienced drivers, high spatial ability 
people and drivers with much local knowledge. They will only 
reach resource-limited conditions in difficult traffic 
situations. Of course, the distinctions taken between the 
drivers’ variables are very rough. Moreover, subjects will 
probably seldom combine all good or all bad characteristics to 
represent “best case” or “worst case” groups of test drivers. 
With respect to mental bad we propose to establish a route in a 
city because of its higher complexity over rural traffic 
situations and its greater economy in gathering relevant data on 
driving behaviour. 
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4.2.Visual cost 
 
Visual costs of the use of NS are likely to occur in urban 
traffic conditions. But there is reason to believe that effects 
on drivers visual distraction can manifest themselves on rural 
streets as well. Whereas route—following is easy on motorways it 
may be quite a difficult task on rural streets with many curves, 
bad visibility or slopes. The course of the road cannot be 
anticipated as easy as on a motorway and thus affords more visual 
control of the roadway ahead. Distraction caused by the visual 
demands of reading an in—car display therefore could show 
observable effects on driver behaviour. 
 
4.3. Over-reliance 
 
Over-reliance effects can be studied in certain traffic sites 
which are listed in chapter 5. If a NS is suspected to facilitate 
over-reliance effects, these situations should be incorporated 
into test routes with medium complexity for novice and elderly 
drivers, foreign drivers or subjects with bow spatial ability. 
Traffic situations with overconfidence effects can be imagined on 
all kind of roads. If a researcher therefore has enough resources 
he is advised to check for these effects on rural and urban —
roads. Even experienced drivers can be liable to over-reliance 
for reasons other than high mental bad. It may therefore not be 
necessary to confront them with high complexity conditions, 
unless they are judged to posses high spatial abilities. If 
drivers hold good general knowledge of the road environment but 
not a complete representation of all details (like the occurrence 
of one—way streets, the prohibition of turning manoeuvres at 
certain junctions etc) they may be liable to over-reliance 
effects under high complexity conditions. If they perfectly know 
the routes, e.g. because they are part of a daily routine, no 
over-reliance effects are likely to emerge. We would therefore 
not propose to include special over-reliance situations for these 
drivers. 
 
4.4. Pedestrians and cyclists 
 
A possible danger to unprotected road—users through NS use can 
never be excluded (exception: on motorways). Test routes should 
therefore always be composed in a way to ascertain the occurrence 
of pedestrians and bicyclists along parts of the track. That does 
not mean, that the route should be constructed to include large 
residential areas, but to allow for encounters with pedestrians 
on crosswalks etc. The advice to pay special attention to 
problems with unprotected road users is independent of driver 
characteristics. 
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5. TASK ELEMENTS FOR SPECIAL EFFECTS 
 
This chapter lists certain traffic situations that should be 
included in test routes, if the NS under study can be suspected 
to be liable to divert the driver’s visual attention, to produce 
over-reliance, or may bead to hazardous situations for 
unprotected road users. These situations should be included for 
both high and medium complexity test routes and should be 
involved in greater numbers then a representative route would 
allow for. 
 
Visual distraction 
 
Visual distraction can be dangerous and can have observable 
effects where the expectation of the driver is not in sufficient 
accordance with traffic reality in the near future. Driving 
behaviour —like most human behaviour— is strongly governed by 
continuity phenomena (NÄÄTÄNEN & SUMMALA 1976): In the absence of 
contradictory cues drivers anticipate the traffic environment to 
“behave” in a consistent, predictable way. That argument holds 
true for street characteristics (a motorway is supposed to 
continue as a motorway beyond a curve, a street going up a hill 
straight ahead is expected to bead straight ahead down the other 
side of the hill, etc.) as well as behaviour of other traffic 
participants (e. g., “common movement illusion”, constant speeds 
and directions). Visual distraction therefore can become 
dangerous in situations where the diversion from the front view 
can bead the driver to miss visual cues from the road environment 
that signalise deviations from the continuos and “normally”, 
expected traffic situations. Typical observations that can often 
be traced back to visual distraction are lane exceedences, 
especially when the route guidance deviates from usual standards. 
Other disturbances caused by visual distraction could be late or 
erroneous decisions and control actions. 
 
Include for rural areas: 
— narrow roads 
— roads with curves and slopes 
- curves with unusual radius and bad visibility 
— narrowing roads 
— junctions with unusual geometry and their approaches 
 
Include for urban areas: 
— work sites 
— bane closures 
— set—off carriageways 
 
Over-reliance 
 
Over-reliance in the sense that a driver strictly accepts all 
system proposals can lead to insufficient route selection if the 
system is not really good. But in most cases this will only bead 
to loss of time or comfort, create anger, etc. More interesting 
for our topic is the case where a system proposes a behaviour 
that can be dangerous (or is prohibited) or seems to do so. If a 
system gives a spatial representation of the road environment and 
indicates car position and travel destination (as Travel pilot 
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for instance does), include situations, where the nearest way to 
the destination is not the best to reach it. Of special interest 
are cases where the nearest route is 
 
— a one—way street in the wrong direction 
- is prohibited or only for residents 
— can only be reached by a prohibited manoeuvre 
 
Over-reliance can probably also manifest itself in sudden 
manoeuvres meant to prepare for system proposals; e. g., a sudden 
lane—change without proper preparation (booking into a mirror, 
signalising the intention to other road users) if the system 
advises the drivers to turn off at the next junction. Therefore, 
include multilane approaches to all kinds of junctions. 
Overconfidence can also occur in situations where system 
proposals contradict alternative evidence from sign—boards (both 
in urban and rural areas). 
 
Include parts of motorways near parking lots, access points, 
service areas. 
 
Pedestrians and cyclists 
 
In urban areas: 
 
- Include 04,05,06,07 
— Include pedestrian crossings on Cl to 07, if possible: 
- Include Cl to 07 with cyclists but without bicycle crossings 
or bicycle ways; 
if possible: 
- Include Kl to K4 with pedestrian crossings, especially with 
car turning right (left in UK) 
 
in rural areas: 
 
— Include narrow, complex local traffic guidance. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
How to proceed in constructing a test route for a given NS: 
 
Given a certain NS, what are the most suited test routes to check 
the systems influence on driver behaviour with regard to safety 
effects? The following procedure, ordered into different steps, 
shows how this report can help to construct a suited source and 
destination for an experimental evaluation. 
 
Step 1: Find the group of drivers the system is intended for 
 
Step 2: Find the best suited degree of complexity of the test 
route 
 
Step 3: Find the typical elements of a route with the given 
degree of complexity from Chapter 5.1. 
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Step 4: By referring to Chapter 2, are visual distraction or 
over-reliance possible effects of the system you are 
going to study? 
 
Step 5: If you found one or more special effects in the previous 
step, turn to Chapter 5 to find the traffic situations 
these special effects can occur in, and include these 
situations in your route. 
 
Step 6: Find a real course that approximately fulfils the 
demands of Steps 3 and 5 
 
Step 7: If you have some degrees of freedom left, try to define 
start and destination of the test trip to shift the 
route towards representativeness. Use the information 
from Chapter 5 and the appendix. 
 
Remarks: If the group of drivers the system is to support is 
unspecified, prefer worst case conditions, e.g. select novice 
and/or elderly drivers as subjects. This is because positive as 
well as negative effects of the system on driver performance will 
show up more clearly with these drivers. 
 
If you don’t want to explore a general purpose navigation system 
but a system with a very specific application, say an address 
finding system for taxi drivers, then you should draw a 
representative sample of taxi drivers, define the events you want 
to observe as safety indices and accompany the taxi drivers for a 
certain time interval on the job. The narrower the application 
idea of the system is, and the better specified the target group 
of potential users is, the more is the question of what test 
route to select can be answered. 
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